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A dispersion condition for traders’ forecasts in a general equilibrium model wtth 
uncertainty and asymmetric information yields improved results for some 
(microeconomic) situations in which rational expectations equilibria need not exist. 
The hypothesis of suitably dispersed forecasts implies that consumers’ aggregate 
excess demand is a continuous function and therefore a fixed point theorem may be 
applied to obtain a price vector (for each state of the world) such that markets 
clear. Stronger assumptions give existence of approximately rational expectations 
equilibria and the convergence of forecast distributions to rational expectations. 
‘b 1985 Academic Press. Inc 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For many markets under uncertainty, a large number of traders each act 
in a competitive manner. Preferences depend on the state of the world, and 
agents hold different beliefs about the meaning of observed endogenous 
variables, such as prices. This paper explores some of the consequences of 
perfectly competitive trading when agents have different beliefs. Perfect 
competition suggests the presence of many traders, each of whom is 
insignificant in the market. By different information, we mean that traders’ 
forecasts-or assumed relationships between unknown parameters which 
affect preferences and observed prices in the market-are dispersed. Agents 
have truly different beliefs, although it might be the case that a high per- 
centage of them have forecasts which are similar, or very close to the actual 
relationship. We shall analyze the possibilities for rational expectations 
equilibria in such a microeconomic model. 
A prototype market having these characteristics is the stock market. At 
least a subset of traders is of large cardinality and consists of traders who 
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individually play a quite minor role in determining market prices. Casual 
empiricism suggests that traders have different beliefs about future stock 
prices, and that each is quite firmly convinced that his beliefs are correct. In 
other words, agents’ forecasts are dispersed and each agent admits no 
uncertainty about the validity of his own forecast. 
The major results of this paper suggest that such markets may be quite 
well behaved, in spite of some counterexamples which indicate the opposite 
case. In particular, the existence of equilibrium price functions is assured 
when nonatomic traders have dispersed information. Moreover, we give 
examples of some conditions which imply that there are expectations 
equilibria in which agents’ beliefs are approximately correct. In this class of 
examples, convergence of forecasts to the approximately rational expec- 
tations equilibria occurs as the traders learn about the market. These 
approximately rational expectations equilibria are not revealing in general. 
By now, the possibility of nonexistence of rational expectations equilibria 
is a well-known phenomenon. Counterexamples to existence of equilibria 
when prices transmit information were first developed by Kreps [30]. 
“Open” counterexamples, in which nonexistence persists under sufficiently 
small perturbations of the economic data, have been discovered by Green 
[21] and by Jordan and Radner [29]. Recent positive results assert that 
the existence of strict rational expectations equilibria which are revealing is 
generic if the set of signals or states of the world is finite (Radner [35]) or 
of sufficiently low dimension relative to the number of commodities in the 
economy (Allen [2,4]). Work by Jordan [28] suggests that “fewness” of 
states is essential for generic existence and revelation-in particular, if the 
set of states is of higher dimension than the price simplex, then, generically, 
the efficient markets hypothesis fails. However, if the set of states of the 
world is of strictly higher dimension than the price simplex, then, for a 
residual set of economies (satisfying slightly stronger assumptions than 
those used in [2,4, 353) there is a strict rational expectations equilibrium 
which is given by a price function (mapping from states of the world to 
price vectors) which is a two-to-one mapping and which is almost 
everywhere discontinuous, see [27]. Existence theorems have also been 
proved under special assumptions on the structure of demands or the dis- 
tribution of the underlying random variable [12, 20, 22-251. All of the 
literature discussed above has used models with finitely many traders. 
However, these results-and the relevant counterexamples-would also 
hold for type economies (economies with a continuum of traders in which 
only a finite number of types of traders are included). 
Another approach is to abandon the requirement of strict rational expec- 
tations equilibria-that is, to allow agents to retain some doubts and thus 
to place positive conditional probability on events which are contradicted 
by their expectations. Radner [34] examined an imperfect markets model 
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with finitely many traders. He showed that if the unconditional measure is 
absolutely continuous with respect to any agent’s prior probability measure 
conditioned on any information, then an equilibrium price function (a 
measurable mapping from the set of states of the world into the 
appropriate price simplex) exists and is rational in the sense that agents’ 
prior beliefs are never contradicted by their observation of the true state of 
the world after trading has occurred. The absolute continuity condition 
says that, no matter what is observed, each agent’s prior beliefs, con- 
ditional on that information, are dispersed. No event which occurs with 
positive unconditional probability is ever assigned conditional probability 
zero by anyone, regardless of the available information. However, the 
major problem with Radner’s “imperfect markets model” result is the lack 
of economic rationale for the dispersion assumption about conditional 
beliefs. If I see a blizzard from my window, or observe a price which occurs 
only when there is a blizzard, why should I assign positive probability to 
the event “sunshine, and temperature at least 75”F”? Perhaps this can be 
justified if agents are currently discovering the relationship between states 
of the world and prices, but, in that case, the learning process which yields 
such an “imperfect markets model” should be explicitly modeled formally. 
(This point was observed by Radner in [34].) 
Perhaps this work could be viewed as an attempt to clarify the 
relationship between Radner’s result on the existence of rational expec- 
tations equilibrium for imperfect market models and known results and 
counterexamples concerning the possibilities for existence of strict rational 
expectations equilibria. The key observation is the substitution of a con- 
dition about dispersion of information (or forecasts) among imperfectly 
informed agents for Radner’s assumption (that no agent ever excludes as 
impossible any open set of prices). It is suggested that the dispersion con- 
dition is natural, compatible with the hypothesis that all agents strictly 
believe their information, and, to some extent, potentially testable. 
The strategy used in this paper will be to examine expectations equilibria 
in a class of idealized perfectly competitive economies having many 
negligible agents. The philosophy behind the use of such models is that 
price taking behavior can be justified rigorously only in economies with a 
nonatomic continuum of agents. Moreover, a typical negligible agent need 
not worry that his own actions will reveal private information through 
market prices; thus the positive disincentive to utilize one’s own infor- 
mation is removed. However, this would be a rather trivial modification of 
the basic model if it were not for the folk theorem that large economies 
tend to be better behaved than small economies. (See [g-10, 261, and for 
economies under uncertainty, [ 15, 16, 381.) This paper specializes this 
observation to economies in which prices convey information and attempts 
to apply “large economies” techniques to the problem of the existence of 
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rational expectations equilibria. I believe that these techniques help us to 
understand the nature of the difficulty which is the source of nonexistence 
phenomena. In particular, they help to separate the discontinuity (which 
negates the use of fixed point theorems to prove existence) from the 
“greased pig” factor’ (that in dynamic learning situations, expectations and 
prices may not converge). 
In may ways, the real purpose of this paper is to explore a sensible 
modification of the rational expectations hypotheses. My interest is in 
precisely those cases which are not covered by the generic existence results, 
[2, 4, 27, 351 for strict rational expectations equilibria. The natur’e of some 
of the assumptions used to obtain approximate rationality and convergence 
indicate that this approach tends to be less than satisfactory for general 
equilibrium analysis, although the assumptions compare favorably to those 
used in the partial equilibrium rational expectations literature (i.e., [ 12, 13, 
22, 231). 
2. THE MODEL 
The model attempts to capture the phenomena of many negligible agents 
and dispersed forecasts among imperfectly informed agents. In order to 
make the dependence of endogenous variables on the state of the world 
nontrivial, I hypothesize that a positive fraction of agents have perfect 
information about the state of the world and that this knowledge is reflec- 
ted in their demand functions through the maximization of a state-depen- 
dent utility function. For technical reasons, I shall work with well-behaved 
smooth functions throughout the model. 
There is a continuum of imperfectly informed agents. A typical such 
agent will be denoted a. For simplicity, I will give these agents names in A, 
a closed subset of the unit interval’ [0, 11. The o-field of measurable sub- 
sets of these agents will be precisely the Bore1 subsets 9(A) of A. The 
measure describing the “weight” of a coalition of these agents is taken to be 
Lebesgue measure 1* on (A, g(A)). Then our nonatomic continuum of 
imperfectly informed agents is described by the measure space (A, g(A), A). 
Agents who are perfectly informed will be the subset B = [0, 1 ] \A of the 
unit interval. A typical such trader will be denoted B. For simplicity, 
assume that ;4 = [0, c] and B= (c, 11, where 0 -CC < 1. Assume, also to 
simplify, that there is a nonatomic continuum of perfectly informed agents 
’ I owe this analogy to Bruce Greenwald. 
* Both standard representations and distributions of agents’ characteristics will be used for 
convenience. Note that any distribution on a separable complete metric space has a standard 
representation [26, p.501. 
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described by the measure space (B, g(B), 1). Then c= 1(A) =j; dt and 
1 -c = ,4(B) = 1: dt are the (strictly positive) fractions of imperfectly and 
perfectly informed agents respectively. 
The set Sz of states of the world is a compact smooth m-dimensional 
manifold which is a subset of R”. Events, or measurable subsets of states of 
the world, consist of the Bore1 subsets 3?(Q) = 9 of Q. Let p be a non- 
atomic probability measure on (~2, 9); it describes the objective or agreed- 
upon subjective probabilities of the occurrence of various events. The sym- 
bol o will represent a typical state of the world. Assume that p has a den- 
sity g with respect to m-dimensional Lebesgue measure on Q. 
Consumption sets for all consumers are taken to be the strictly positive 
orthant W+ + of I-dimensional Euclidean space, where 1 is the number 
(finite) of commodities present in the economy. Prices shall be normalized 
to lie in the I- 1 dimensional open unit simplex in R’, 
d={qER’++ I C:= 1 q, = 1). Each agent CY has a strictly positive initial 
endowment vector e, which is independent of the state of the world, while 
for an agent b, his initial endowment function 
eg: (Q, 5) -+ CR’+ + , WR’+ + 1) 
is a (vector-valued) random variable (measurable function) which is, in 
fact, a C’ mapping from Q to OX’+ + . Assume that there is some compact 
subset K of R’+ + such that (i) for all a E A, ear E K and (ii) for all /I E B and 
all o E 52, ep(o) E K. This will have the effect of giving a uniform bound for 
budget sets and demands whenever prices are bounded away from zero. In 
addition, assume that initial endowments are measurable (in a and /I). 
To describe the dependence of agents’ preferences on the state of the 
world, they shall be represented by state-dependent (cardinal) utility 
functions. Smoothness and measurability will be assumed. Define mappings 
24: A x R’+ + x 52 -t R 
v:BxW ++XQ--,R 
which are measurable in A or B, C’ functions on II@+ + and C’ functions on 
Q (and hence jointly measurable). The evaluation u,(x, o) shall mean the 
utility to agent a of consuming commodity bundle x E lF@+  when the state 
of the world is o, and up(x, o) the analogous utility for agent fl. For each 
c( E A, B E B, and w  E Sz, assume the following: 
(i) strict (differentiable) monotonicity: for each x E W+ + , 
D,u,(x, w) $ 0 and DIuB(x, o) $ 0. 
(ii) strict (differentiable) concavity: for each XE KY’+ + , DxXu,(x, o) 
and Dsxug(x, o) are negative definite. 
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(iii) boundary condition: for all y E R, cl R,{~~~ R’+ + 1 U&X, o) = y } 
and cl Rg,{x E R’+ + 1 u&x, w) = y } are contained in BP+ + 
The set of utilities satisfying (i), (ii), and (iii) is a G6 subset of C’(R’+ + , 
R), endowed with topology of C* uniform convergence on compact subsets 
[l, Theorem 2.11. With these assumptions, for o ~52 known to all agents, 
demands are C’ functions on Q x A which are measurable in CI or /I and 
uniformly bounded on compact subsets of A. They also satisfy the boun- 
dary condition that as q,, + qE aA, demand (for each o E Q, CIE A and 
/I E B) is unbounded. 
Finally, we will describe agents’ information. Each trader /I E B is per- 
fectly informed-he knows the true state of the world w  before trading, and 
thus his demand x E R’+ + is chosen to maximize up( ., o) subject to q. x < 
q. e&w), where q E A is the price vector prevailing in the market. Note that 
the budget set is known with certainty, and, because these traders are 
assumed to be perfectly informed initially, their initial endowments do not 
tell them any additional information. The situation for the imperfectly 
informed traders c1 E A is quite different. Their knowledge is summarized by 
forecast functions which relate the state of the world to the endogenous 
economic variables which they observe. Let 
represent trader Cos forecast or economic model. The pa are assumed to be 
C’ functions, and 
p: (A, 93(A)) + (C’P, a,, WC’@4 2))) 
is assumed to be a measurable function. The topology on C’(s2,a) is given 
by the C’ sup norm: 
II Px -Pi II = ;t; { II P,(W) - Pk.(O)ll + II D, P,(W) - DOI Ph(o)ll>. 
With this norm, C’(s2, 2) is a complete separable normed space. When 
agent c( observes price vector q ~2, the agent maximizes expected utility 
conditioned on the event {w E Q2( p,(w) = q} if there is some state of the 
world o E Q with p,(o) = q. On the other hand, if for all o E Q, p,(o) #q, 
then agent u maximizes the unconditional expected utility s u,( ., w) &(o). 
In both cases, the budget set is {x E R’+ + I q. x d q. ear}, which is indepen- 
dent of o E Q. We make the following assumption about the distribution of 
forecasts: 
DISPERSION HYPOTHESIS. The marginal distributions A ad(o) ~ ’ of 
1 OP - ’ have bounded densities with respect to (I - 1 )-dimensional 
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Lebesgue measure on A which are uniformly bounded in o E Q. (Note that 
Lop-’ is a probability measure on C’(Q, A); i op(o) ~’ is a probability 
measure on A for each 0.) 
This says that, for any o E 0, not too many of the imperfectly informed 
traders agree too much about the price vector which corresponds to that 
particular state of the world w. For example, if the marginals were uniform 
on A for each o E Q, the dispersion hypothesis would be satisfied. It would 
be violated if, for some w  E Q, the support of 1 ~fi(w) ~ ’ was contained in a 
subset of A of strictly lower dimension. Other counterexamples would be 
provided by cases in which the distribution of ioF I has an atom for 
some w, or mass piles up in such a way as to “approach” a marginal dis- 
tribution with atoms. 
Remarks. All of our results would hold if the measure space of perfectly 
informed agents contained atoms. However, the nonatomicity assumption 
simplifies notation and is consistent with our interpretation of many 
negligible traders. 
3. CONTINUITY OF DEMAND AND THE EXISTENCE OF 
A MARKET-CLEARING PRICE FUNCTION 
I shall prove that, under the dispersion hypothesis, demand in each state 
of the world is a continuous function of price and that there exists a 
market-clearing price function p: D -+ A. To fix notation, write EU,(x; pl, 
q) for Cos expected utility of consuming XE R’+ + , given forecast 
p, E C’(Q, a), when q E A is the prevailing price vector. Assume that the 
Dispersion Hypothesis stated in the previous section is satisfied. 
Assume also that dim 52 = dim A (or m = I- 1 ), so that we are focusing 
precisely on those cases which are not included in the results of Allen 
[2,4] or Jordan [27]. Note that the case of just as many parameters 
(describing the set of states of the world) as (relative) prices has some 
important and natural economic interpretations. For instance, suppose that 
the uncertainty concerns the prices of assets or commodities during the 
next period. 
The following technical assumption is also necessary: 
UNIFORM BOUNDEDNESS HYPOTHESIS. For all WEQ and almost allo!EA, 
the derivatives D,, p,(o) of agents’ forecasts pz : Q + A are uniformly boun- 
ded. 
THEOREM 1. Given qE A, for almost all c1 E A, there are open 
neighborhoods N,(q) of A such that EU,(x; pa, q’) is a C’ function of q’ on 
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N,(q) for all XE RI+ + . For these choices, conditional expected utilities are 
C2 on the commodity space RI+ + 
Proof: Think of w  E Q as a generalized time parameter and p, as a Sam- 
ple path of a generalized stochastic process on the probability triple (A, 
g(A), J-/A(A)) which takes values in a. A theorem of Bulinskaya ( [ 141; see 
also [ 17, p. 761) states the following: 
(i) Let u be fixed. If the one-dimensional density f;(x) of the process 
r(t) is bounded in x and in 0 < t 6 1, and if t(t) has, with probability one, a 
continuous sample derivative t’(t), then the probability is zero that 
t’(t) = 0, r(t) = 2.4 simultaneously, for any point t in 0 < t < 1. In particular, 
there is zero probability of t(t) being tangential to the level u anywhere in 
O<t<l. 
(ii) Under the conditions of (i), the number of times <(t)=u in 
0 6 t < 1 is finite with probability one. 
If 52 = a= [0, l] (i.e., if m = 1 and I= 2), interpret the realization of the 
stochastic process (or sample path) as pz, tE [0, l] as o~sZ= [0, 11, and 
u as q. Note that the boundedness of one-dimensional densities is assured 
by the Dispersion Hypothesis, If I- 1 = dim d = dim Q = M > 1, the exten- 
sion of Bulinskaya’s Theorem to random fields given by Allen [7, 
Theorems 4.1 and 4.31, which uses the Uniform Boundedness Hypothesis, 
states that, under the Dispersion Hypothesis, for any q E d, except possibly 
for a in some null set (which depends on q), there is no co E Q for which 
p,(w) = q and det D,, p,(o) = 0. Moreover, for almost every CI E A, there are 
only finitely many w  E Q for which p,(o) = q. Eliminate this null set 
(depending on q) of CI E A where it is not the case that p,(. ) m (q ). Call the 
remaining set of “good” agents A(q). For each CI E A(q), q is a regular value 
of the smooth function pm, or p1 h (q >. Since Q is compact, pY- l(q) is a 
finite set whenever 51 E A(q). (See [33, p. 81.) 
It follows by a standard argument from the Implicit Function Theorem 
that for each r E ,4(q) there is an open neighborhood N(q) in 2 and finitely 
many smooth functions g, ,..., g,,,l,y, with 
g,: N,(q) + Q 
such that p, ‘(4’) = ( g,(q’),..., g,,,,,,(q’)) for all q’ E N,(q). In particular, 
#p; ‘(. ) = n(a, q) is constfnt on N,(q). For a E A(q), q’ E N,(q), and 
XE w+ + define (recall that g is the density for p) 
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Note that, for c( and q’ as above, these expressions define CL’S conditional , 
expected utility given {o E D 1 p,(o) = q’}. By interchanging limits, 
derivatives, and finite sums, it can be seen that EU,( .; pcl, q’) is C* on 
R’+ + for a and q’ as above. Furthermore, for a E A(q) and all x E rW’+ + , 
EU,(x; par, .) is C’ on N,(q). 1 
Remarks. Recall that pX A [q} means that whenever u E Q is such that 
p,(w) = q, then the (1- 1) x (I- 1) matrix D,p,(o) has full rank, or 
det D,, p,(o) # 0. Transversality plays a key role in the argument because it 
is precisely where D,p,(w) drops rank that r’s conditional expected utility, 
and hence demand, becomes (in general) discontinuous as a function of the 
price vector. By “spreading out” such discontinuities, so that for each q E A 
they affect only a subset which has measure zero of agents in A, we can 
remove them by aggregation. 
THEOREM 2. For fixed q E A, there is a subset of imperfectly informed 
agents A(q) of full measure, such that for each’ a E A(q), there is an open 
neighborhood N,(q), of q in A such that a’s demand 
.y,: N,(q) --t R: + 
and LX’S excess demand 
- . N,(q) + [w’ -a. 
44’) 7 x,(d) - e7 
are C’ functions on N,(q). 
Proof: By inspection of the formula for EU,(x;p,, q’) for a E A and 
q’ E N,(q), it can be seen that these conditional expected utilities satisfy 
strict (differentiable) monotonicity, strict (differentiable) concavity, and the 
boundary condition. (Details are analogous to the proof of Lemma 4.1 in 
[ 1 I.) Furthermore, they are C* functions of the commodity bundle and C’ 
functions of the parameter q’. Hence demand is a Cl function when restric- 
ted to the set N,(q) n A. This is true also for excess demands, which are just 
equal to the demand functions minus the constant initial endowment vec- 
tor. 1 
I COROLLARY 1. Fix q E A, and choose N( < CO) agents randomly from the 
probability space (A, S?(A), A). Then, with probability one, there is an open 
neighborhood U(q) of q in A such that their total demand is a C’ function on 
U(q). 
Proof With probability one, all Iv agents are members of A(q). Take 
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U(q) = fly= 1 N,,(q) for the open neighborhood of q. On this set, each 
agent’s demand is C’ by the theorem. 1 
THEOREM 3. The aggregate demand of the imperfectly informed agents 
X,:A-#+, 
X,(q) = j x,(q) da 
A 
and their aggregate excess demand 
are continuous functions. 
Proof. Fix q E A, and let { qn} be a sequence in A converging to q. For 
continuity, I need to show that X,(q,) -+ X,(q). Let K be a compact subset 
of A containing q and all of the qn. For any q’ E K and all a E A, the budget 
sets {xER’+ + (q’.x<q’.e.j are uniformly bounded. By definition, 
demands must lie in budget sets, so that this gives a uniform bound for 
demand vectors for all c1 E A, and all q,, and q. By the above, for almost 
every a E A, x,(q,) +x,(q) as n + co (pointwise in a E N(a)). Hence by 
dominated convergence, 
lim 
s x,(q, 1 da = n+z 4 
IA :+“t, x,(q,J da = jA x,(q) da 
or 
lim X,(q,) = X,(q). 
qn - Y 
Similarly, lim,” _ y Z,(q,) = Z,(q), since aggregate excess demand differs 
from aggregate demand by the finite constant j4 e,da which is independent 
of 4. I 
THEOREM 4. For each w E Q, aggregate excess demand at CO, Z, : A -+ IX”, 
given by 
= Z,(q) + Z,(q, 0)) = Z(q, 0) 
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is continuous on A, satisfies Walras’ Law, and obeys the boundary condition 
that if q,, + q E aA, then the sequence { 11 .Z(q,, o)ll } is unbounded. 
Proof. By Theorem 3, Z,( .) is continuous on A. To see that Z,( ., w) is 
continuous for each w  E Q, note that the individual demands for informed 
agents xp(q, o) were formed by maximizing the utilities uB(x, o) over the 
budget sets (x E rW’+ + 1 q. x < q. eB(w)}, so that, in fact, for each /I E B, 
xa( ., .) is CL in both variables. (Recall that eB( .) was C’ and up was C’ on 
S2 and C2 on I??‘+ + and that, furthermore, for each w  E 52, up( ., o) has no 
critical point and represents preferences which have indifference surfaces 
with nonvanishing Gaussian curvature.) Now let q, -+ q. By uniform boun- 
dedness of initial endowments, budget sets, and hence demands, are 
uniformly bounded for all b E B and all q,, and q. Use dominated con- 
vergence for each o E Sz to conclude that 
lim Xs(q,,, w) = lim x,Jq,,, o) d/l = lim x&q,,, CO) d/l 
4” - 4 II - 32 j 1‘ n + cc 
= s xg(q, w) @=Jf,(q, o), 
which says that X,( ., o) is continuous on A. For any o, JB e&a) dB is 
finite. Thus, for each w  E Q, 
lim Ze(q,l, w) = lim Jf,(q,,, 0) - lB ep(o) d/j’ 
4” - 4 Yn + 4 
= Xdq, 0) - JB es(o) 4 = Z,(q, w), 
which shows that Z,( ., o) is continuous on A. Hence Z( ., o) = Z,(. ) + 
Z,( ., o) is a continuous function on A, for all w  E Q. 
To see that q * Z(q, w) = 0, V’w E 0, note that the individual excess 
demands satisfy Walras’ Law: 
4. -‘x(q) = 0 VslEA 
4’-‘/?(4, ml=0 VpE B, V’oEQ. 
Hence Walras’ Law must also hold for their integral. 
Finally, to prove that the boundary condition is satisfied, we shall again 
note that it is fulfilled for each agent. By Fatou’s Lemma and continuity, 
for each commodity j = l,..., 1 
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s lim inf xJ,(q,,) da + A n-x I lim inf xJB(qn, * n-x, 
< lim inf [ x’,(q,) da + lim inf [ 
< lim inf 
n - IX, 
x;(qn) da + B x$ (qn> ~14 s 1 
6 lim inf [X;(q,) + X/,(q,, 0)] 
n t cc 
d lim X’(q,, w) = XJ(q, 0). 
n 4 x 
Since for each ~1, j3, and o, /I x,(q,)ll + 00 and II xB(qn, o)ll + co, for each 
o E Q, there is some commodity j and there are subsets A ’ c A and B/O c B 
with either I(AJ)>O or L(B’“) >O such that 
Hence XJ(q,, w) > JA,xh(qn) da + jBlwxj(q,, o) dfl (because demands are 
bounded from below by O-the consumption sets are R’+ + ). Now let 
n + CC to conclude that, for each o E Q, there is j (1 <j< I) such 
that XJ(q,, u) -+ co. By definition, Z’(q,,, o) = XJ(q,, w) -JA e; da - 
jB eg(w) d/? where the aggregate initial endowments are uniformly bounded 
(in a, 8, and 0). Hence, for each w, there is j such that Z’(q,, co) -+ 00 as 
n -+ 05. This proves that 11 Z(q,, o)ll --+ cc as n --) CD. 1 
THEOREM 5. There is a market-clearing price function, i.e., there is 
such that, ,for all o E Q, Z( p(w). w) = 0. 
Proof Fix w  E Sz arbitrarily. Z( ., o) is continuous on A, satisfies 
Walras’ Law, and the boundary condition. By [19, p. 781, these conditions 
imply that there is a p(o) E A such that Z( p(o), w) = 0. 1 
4. EXISTENCE OF APPROXIMATELY RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIA 
From the preceding results and assumptions, we know that, given any 
distribution of endowments and preferences for the informed agents and 
any distribution of utilities and forecasts for which the distribution of 
forecasts is dispersed, excess demand depends continuously on the price 
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vector. Hence, there is a market-clearing price correspondence p: D -+ A. 
However, we have not shown any relationship between p and the forecasts 
of uninformed agents. Of course, if p were a C’ function and if for every 
uninformed agent IX, p1 =p, then p would form a rational expectations 
equilibrium for the economy. Unfortunately, such a distribution of 
forecasts is not dispersed-it is the atomic measure 6,. If we were to per- 
turb this disribution slightly in an appropriate way, we could have disper- 
sed distributions of forecasts which are arbitrarily close to S,-that is, 
forecasts which are approximately correct, This is what is meant by the 
phrase “approximately rational expectations equilibrium.” 
Formally, say that p is an wational expectations equilibrium if p is a 
market-clearing C’ price function and 
max [II P,(O) -P(o)ll + II DPAo) - &%o)lI I< E C” E Q UEA. 
for almost every 
This means that, except for a null set of agents, everyone’s forecast is 
within E of being correct for all o EL?, and furthermore, the derivatives 
which reflect the dependence of prices on states of the world are also within 
E of being completely accurate. Note that if p is a strict rational expec- 
tations equilibrium (in the sense of [2, 351) then it is also an s-rational 
expectations equilibrium for all E > 0. 
As a first step, we will make some additional assumptions. 
ASSUMPTION Al (Compact support). The distribution of informed 
agents’ state-dependent utilities ug E C’(Q, C*( W+ + , R)) has compact sup- 
port (for the topology of C’ uniform convergence on compact subsets of 
@+ + and C’ uniform convergence on the compact set Q). 
PROPOSITION. The informed agents’ aggregate excess demand 
is a C” function from d^ x l2 into R’, where 6 denotes any compact subset of 
A. 
Proof By assumption, ep: B -+ R’+ + is C’ for each B and es(o) and 
Des(w) are uniformly bounded in B and w  (except possibly for null set of /I 
agents) by the compact support assumption. Also by Assumption Al, for 
almost ail fi, the state-dependent utilities uP( .; . ) are contained in a com- 
pact subset of C’(0, C’(W’+ + , R)). Hence, for almost all fi, for all o E 52, 
the vP( .; o) lie in a compact subset of C*(R’+ + , R). Hence, by [I], for 
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almost all /I and all w, the demands x$( .; o) lie in a compact subset of 
C’@, R: + 1. 
To show smoothness of aggregate excess demand, we need to differen- 
tiate under the integral sign. For fixed q E A, 
and for fixed o E Q, 
D,Z,(q, 0) = D, jB xp*(q; w) 4’ 
= 
s 
D,x;(q; co) dfi. 
I3 
(See [31, pp. 282, 3751.) 
On d^ x 0, everything is uniformly bounded a.e. on B. Hence these 
derivatives are continuous by the dominated convergence theorem. m 
ASSUMPTION A2 (Independence ). Among uninformed agents, the dis- 
tribution of state-dependent utility functions, the distribution of initial 
endowments, and the distribution of forecasts are independent. 
ASSUMPTION A3 (Log-linear utilities for uninformed agents). For almost 
all a E A, 
u,(x, w) = .$ f;(w) log x, 
/=I 
for some function f: A x R + A(y), where A(y) = (( y, ,..., yr) E 
~‘++Ic;=,4’,=1 and y d y, < 1 - y, j = l,..., I), which is measurable in tl 
and C* in the parameter o E Q. 
ASSUMPTION A4 (Homogeneity of uninformed agents’ preferen- 
ces). Among uninformed agents, the distribution of utility functions 
associated with a given state of the world is independent of the state. That 
is, the “image measures” 2 0 (f(o)) - ’ are independent of w  E 0. 
ASSUMPTION A5 (Informed agents’ preferences). For almost all /I E B 
and all o E Q, u8( -, o) can be expressed as a strictly increasing transfor- 
mation of some log-linear utility function (which depends on fl and 0). 
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Remark. The purpose of Assumption A5 is to ensure that the market- 
clearing price correspondence p is a C’ function. Sufficiently slight pertur- 
bations of the up( ., o) will not destroy this property. Alternatively, we 
could have assumed that, regardless of the pa functions, the economy is 
regular and satisfies one of the properties (gross substitutes, dominant 
diagonal, etc.) which sufftce to ensure uniqueness of competitive 
equilibrium in economies without uncertainty. 
THEOREM 6. Under all of the above assumptions, for any E >O an E- 
rational expectations equilibrium exists. 
ProoJ: For the original economy, with uninformed agents’ forecasts p,, 
there is an equilibrium price function p: Q + A which is C’ by A3 and A5. 
To describe the resulting revisions of forecasts, let r E (0, 1). Think of r as 
describing how much weight agents place on the current observation. 
Define the forecasts revised (with respect to r) by p as, for each tl E A and 
WEi2 
pi(o) = rP(w) + (1 - r) p,(o). 
Note that p: is a C’ function from Q to A and, furthermore, that the dis- 
tribution of p: satisfies the Dispersion Hypothesis. Hence, there is a 
market-clearing price function p’ for the economy in which uninformed 
agents have forecasts pi. In fact, the crucial property which makes this an 
“easy” convergence theorem is that, for all w  EB, p’(w) =p(w). To see this, 
note that, by A2, A3, and A4, for any given q E A, the demand of an unin- 
formed agent LX for commodity k is (except for a null subset of A) 
xk(q) = ax. q C;LYL( g,(d) d g,(d)1 det D, P,WI - ’ 
I 
qk XJTY”g(g,(q))ldet D, P,(o)I -’ 
where, for almost all MEA, (01 p,(w) = q} equals the finite subset 
{ g,(qL gnb.,,(s)L as in the proof of Theorem 1. Let Ee = j e,da and 
write Effor the vector (l/J(A)) JfJo) da. Th e integral exists (they,(o) are 
bounded, positive and measurable in a), is independent of o, and is strictly 
between zero and one (by A3). Since the distributions of p,, e3, andf, are 
independent, aggregate demand of the uninformed agents is given by 
XA(q)=i x,(q)da=q.Ee 
A 
($,...,+P++. 
X,(q) is a C’ function on A and is independent of the forecasts pa. 
Aggregate excess demand is Z(q; o) = X,(q) - Ee + Z,(q, o), which is also 
independent of the p,. This says that the market-clearing price function p is 
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independent of the pI. A similar argument shows that Z’(q; w)--delined 
with p: in place of p,-is independent of the pi, since the definition of pi 
forces independence of the distributions of pi and f,. In fact, 
Z’(q; w) = X,(q) - Ee + Zn(q, w) = Z(q, 0) 
which forces p(o) =p’(o) for all o E 4. Defining pz = rp’ + (1 - r)pi gives 
pz = p’ =p. Repeating the argument results in a constant sequence of 
market clearing price functions and a sequence of forecasts which satisfies 
all of our assumptions, including dispersion, and which “converges” to ji. 
We have, for each tl E A, 
p:=rjjnp’ + (1 -r)p;-' 
p: = rp” - ’ +(l-r)[rjT’+(l -r)p: ‘1 
=rp+(l -r)rp+(l-r)‘[rp+(l -r)pzP3] 
=(l-r)“pa+[l-(l-r)“]P. 
Hence /( p: -p I/ < (1 - r)” I( p, -p /I for all c1 E A. By the Uniform Bounded- 
ness Hypothesis and the fact that all forecasts and price functions take 
values in A, there is a (finite) number B such that I/ p:, 11 = max,,, 
[\I p,(w)ll + i\Dp,(o)ll] <B for almost all c( EA. Hence 
ilp;-ji//d(l-r)“B 
foralmosteverya~A.SinceO<r<l,(l-r)”~Oasn-,xl.Hence,taking 
n large enough so that (1 - r)” B < E gives an s-rational expectations 
equilibrium, and completes the proof. 1 
COROLLARY 2. As E + 0, the distributions qf revisedforecasts of uninfor- 
med agents converge weakly) (as probability measures on C’(L?, A)) to the 
distribution which gives probability 1 to ji. 
COROLLARY 3. As E + 0, the forecast representations 
p”: A + C’(R, a), 
as measurable functions, converge in Y’(A, 98(A), 2, C’(0, a)) to the con- 
stant function 
p. : A + C’(Q, 2) 
defined by p, =p. 
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Proof We need to examine 
,< 
s 
‘((1 -r)“Bda=~(A)B(l-~)“. 
The right-hand side converges to zero as n becomes large, thereby com- 
pleting the proof. 1 
Remark. Under our assumptions, the aggregate demand of uninformed 
agents is independent of their forecasts, and thus, of the number of 
revisions which have occurred. However, this is not true for individual 
agents. It could be the case that each agent is truly “learning” in the sense 
that, with the use of revised forecasts, his average ex post state-dependent 
utility (of consuming his demand) is increased. 
5. CONVERGENCE 
Examination of the proof of Theorem 6 suggests that convergence to 
rational expectations occurs as traders learn, since as the number of steps t 
becomes large, the revised forecasts pi get arbitrarily close to the actual 
market clearing price function p’. The problem in this interpretation is that 
the sequencing does not seem to make sense as economic optimizing 
behavior in a competitive market. 3 Implicit in the proof was the notion 
that all agents learn the entire market equilibrium relation p’ at the end of 
step t and then simultaneously revise their beliefs about this relationship 
for all states of the world. Yet, before knowing the whole equilibrium price 
function, each trader obtains additional information about market-clearing 
prices for some states-for instance, the first state of the world to be 
realized after the previous revision. Immediate use of this information 
generally leads to higher utility for agents who behave in this way. 
Hence, for an acceptable economic story of real-time dynamic con- 
vergence, all agents should update their forecasts each time a state of the 
world is realized. The explicit sequencing of such a learning process works 
3 I wash to thank Dave Cass for some helpful comments on this point that he made during a 
theory workshop at Penn. At that seminar, I interpreted the proof of an early version of 
Theorem 6 as a simple dynamics of forecast revision. HIS objections and remarks stimulated 
this section; he should not be held responsible for the outcome. 
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as follows: At date t, each agent determines his demand based on his 
current forecast pt and the observed prevailing market price vector p’(o’). 
After trading occurs, the state W’ of the world at time t is revealed to the 
agent. The information acquired in period t is thus that state w1 has p’(w’) 
as its equilibrium price vector. This information should be incorporated 
into the agent’s forecast before he enters the market at date t + 1. If it is 
also known that the market-clearing price functions p’ are continuous, as 
they are in our model, then market-clearing prices at all states o E 52 which 
are close to O’ should be close to the price vector p’(w’). Revision of con- 
tinuous forecast functions in a neighborhood of w, is appropriate. This 
“real-time” learning process and its convergence to approximately rational 
expectations equilibria is formalized in he following result: 
THEOREM 7. Assume that the economy satisfies Al-A5 and the dispersion 
hypothesis. Then, for “real-time dynamics,” as t -+ ‘JC, pi + p Co urnform!, on 
Q and almost surely uniformly in tl E A with probability one. 
Remark 1. More specifically, the dynamics is defined by (where o’ E 52 
is realized at date t) 
p:+‘(w) = rh(c0, w’)p(o’) + (1- r:(w, w’))pf,(w) 
where the parameter mapping (for 0 < y^ < y < 1) 
r’:A-+C’(RxQ, [O,y]) 
is measurable and satisfies, V’w, 0 E Q, VCY EA, and Vt = 1, 2, 3 ,..., 
r:(o, 0) > 0 0 110 - W 11 < l/t 
ilo-wii<l/(t+l)~rt(w,o)>Y* 
The scalar r:(o, 6) tells how much agent a revises (at t) his forecast of the 
price associated with state of the world o given that the realization at time 
t is ~GESZ. 
Remark 2. An alternative way of stating the conclusion is as follows: 
Pr~{wf}p”,,~Vc>0,3Tsuchthatt~T~~//pl,-p(I~<&fora.e.cr~A}=1. 
Proof Under the assumptions, I have a unique p: Q + A which is C’ 
and independent of the pks. I want to show that Pr ( [w’ ) ,7L=, I pk -+ p Co 
uniformly on 52, uniformly for a.e. a, as t + cc > = 1 where the adjustment 
weights that tell how p; is revised are appropriately chosen as assumed in 
the statement of the theorem. To simplify, assume that p is the uniform dis- 
tribution on (52, 9). 
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Fix a and suppose that ol, w2,..., is the sequence of realizations of the 
random variable. At the end of the date t, c1 can observe CD’ and p(o’). 
Then, at any fixed 0 E 0, agent CL’S forecasts are given by 
p;(d) = r;(d, u’)p(u’) + (1 - rA(Q, 0’)) p,(h) 
pp,) = r;(Q, 02)p(02) + (1 - r;(Li), o’))p,@) 
= i$(Q, w2)p(d) + (1 - r;(d), 02)) 
x [r@, o’)p(w’)+(l -T;(& o’))p@)] 
= rf(d, 02)p(02) + r:(&, w’)p(w’) 
+p,(d;) -rp, U’MO) 
+ rZ(c;), 0’) t$(Li), 0’) p,(O) 
= r;(d, w’)p(o’) + [rb(h, 0’) 
- f$(d, 02) r$(d& co’)] p(d) 
+ [ 1 - rh(15, w’) - rf(d, 0’) 
+ r:(Q, 02) rA(&, co’)] p,(c;t). 
Let a, = r;(O, w’). Then 
P,‘(d) = a2 P(02) + Cal - ala21 Jw) 
+ Cl -01 -az+a,dp,(Q) 
=u2J7(w2)+u,(l -u2)j?(o’) 
+ (1 -a,)(1 -az)pa(~). 
More generally, one can show that 
A(d)= fI (1 -dp,(d)+ i b,,P(d 
7= I ,=I 
where ni=, (1 -a,) + C: = 1 b,, = 1 for some b,, E [O, 1 J. 
Pick E > 0 arbitrarily. I claim that there is T(E), which also depends on 
the sequence (or} of realizations of the random variable, such that, for 
almost every ~1, II p:(Q) --~?(Q)ll < E, Vt 2 T(E). 
Let T,(E) be such that t 2 T,(E) and 1) Q - ~3 1) -C l/t =c= 
II P(w) -P(h)/ < 42. Such a finite T,(E) exists by the uniform continuity of 
p on the compact set Q. Then t> T1(e) +r:(Q, co) >O only if 
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II P(d) -P(o)11 < 42, i.e., when summed over s = Tr(s) to s = t, C b,, p(wJ) 
is a nonnegative weighted sum with positive weight only on those p(oS) 
which are within 42 of p(G). Hence, if we renumber so that pI = p,T’“), then 
,:(ml=[~~(l-.,)]P,(0)+[1-~, (1-%)]F 
where 11 d” -p(Q)/1 < 42, since a convex combination ~7’ which gives 
positive weight only to points in [p(G) - E/Z, p(d) + &/2] must also lie in 
the same interval. Hence 
p;(d) -p(d) = fi 
[ 
(1 -a,) 
,=I 1 (p,(d)-j”)+j5’-p(c;, 
r f 
II P:(d) -P(d,)ll d 
1 
n (1 --a,) .I + II d”-p(G)ll 
J = I 1 
<[rj (1 -a.)]+i:2. 
By assumption, 31: >O such that I/ w-O/l < l/(r+ l)*r;(w,w)>$, va. 
This says that Ilu/‘-bll <l/(t+ 1) al-u,<l-$<I. Write S, for the 
event OE [&- l/(t + l), Q-t l/(t + l)]. Then for all t, Pr {u’ES’) = 
2/( t + 1 ), since we assumed that, in each period, the probability law on 52 is 
given by the uniform distribution. Note that the o’ are independent ran- 
dom variables, t = 1, 2, 3 ,..., and C;=, Pr{~fES’}=C;L=I 2/(t+1)=2 
I,?= 2 l/t’ = cx?. Hence Pr (O’E S’ infinitely often) = 1 by the Bore1 Zero- 
One Law [32, p. 2281. Thus, there are infinitely many positive integers t 
forwhich l-~,<l-f;<l. 
Choose T?(E) such that (1 - i;) rz(r’ < 42. Then for t 2 T,(E) + TJE) we 
have // pi(&) -p(&)II GE. Our choices of T,(E) and TJE) are independent 
of r. 
Now I need to show that for a given E >O, I can take T,(E) and T?(C) 
independent of ti, E Q. For T,(s), it is clear by the uniform continuity of I, 
on the compact set 52. For T*(E), note that if TZ(s; 0) works for ci, E Q, then 
it also works for all 0” E S( T?(E); h) = (& - l/( T>(E) + 1). & + l/( TZ(s) + 1)). 
Hence, by compactness, there is a finite collection of S( T?(E); cj) 
which cover 0. Call them S( T:(E); &I,),..., S( Ty(s); dM). Let T2(~; 52) = 
max ( T:(E),..., T?(E)}. Hence for E > 0, with probability one there exists 
T= T,(E)+ TJc;Q)< #x, such that t3 T=max,,., 11 pi(o)-p(o)ll <E for 
every a. In other words Pr ( ( ~‘>,E, I supr max,,, II P:(O) -P(o)ll becomes 
arbitrarily small for sufficiently large t } = 1 = Pr { {w’ 1 I”= , I pi -+ p C” 
uniformly on Q as t + CcI, uniformly on a set of a of full measure ). [ 
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Remark 1. If p is revealing-that is, if it is injective on G--then D forms 
a strict rational expectations equilibrium and the above argument shows 
that this simple “learning process” converges to it. In this case, 
approximately rational expectations equilibria converge monotonically to 
revealing strict rational expectations equilibria, as defined in [2, 351. 
Remark 2. Convergence to rational expectations has recently been 
demonstrated by Blume and Easley, Bray, and Radner for some classes of 
parametric models. Blume and Easley [ 1 l] obtained convergence of a class 
of learning processes (which includes Bayesian revision of priors) when 
there are a finite number of models, one of which is correct. Both Bray 
[ 131 and Radner [36] examined linear models and the use of ordinary 
least squares estimation. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have shown that, in a simple model in which “information” is 
suitably dispersed, discontinuous use of it by individual agents does not 
lead to nonexistence of market-clearing prices in large economies. 
Moreover, an example shows that, at least under some quite strong 
assumptions, s-rational expectations equilibria exist and converge as agents 
revise their forecasts. 
Note that we permit both Q and J-the set of parameters and the set of 
normalized price vectors-to equal the closed unit interval. This is one of 
the cases in which generic existence of rational expectations equilibria fails 
in finite economies [29]. In fact, the Jordan-Radner [29] counterexample 
features log-linear utilities and probability distributions having smooth 
density functions. Sections 4 and 5 show that existence of c-rational expec- 
tations equilibria, for all E > 0, and their convergence as F + 0, can hold for 
some cases in which (i.e., 52 = 6= [0, 11) open counterexamples to the 
existence of strict rational expectations equilibria are known. In this case, 
the s-rational expectations equilibria are not, in general, revealing, even 
though they tend to transmit a nontrivial amount of information. 
An implication of the dispersion hypothesis is that no set of forecasts of 
the form i pz / p,(w) = q} ever receives positive probability, for any fixed 
choice of Q E Q and q E d. This condition is necessary, but not sufficient, for 
the dispersion hypothesis to be satisfied. This observation suggests that a 
test which could contradict (but not verify) the dispersion hypothesis is to 
examine the (marginal) distribution of p,(o) on d for some values of 
o E Q. If the distribution were concentrated at a finite number of points for 
any o EL& the dispersion hypothesis would be violated. If the empirical 
marginal distribution were approximately normal, uniform, etc., then it 
would not assign positive probability to any price vector in 4. 
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